Real-time nite-state systems may be speci ed in linear logic by means of linear implications between conjunctions of xed nite length. In this setting, where time is treated as a dense linear ordering, safety properties may be expressed as certain provability problems. These provability problems are shown to be in pspace. They are solvable, with some guidance, by nite proof search in concurrent logic programming environments based on linear logic and acting as sort of model-checkers. One advantage of our approach is that either it provides unsafe runs or it actually establishes safety.
Introduction
There are a number of formalisms for expressing real-time processes, including 1, 6, 7, 3, 4, 5, 50, 44, 45, 38] . Many of these real-time formalisms are based on temporal logic or its variations 46, 38, 33] or on timed process algebras 14, 42, 43, 23, 12] , or on B uchi automata 52, 3] . In some cases exact complexity-theoretic information is available, such as 51, 3, 5] , while other formalisms are known to be undecidable. In this context, undecidability may arise a priori from the undecidability of traditional predicate logic with binary predicates, or in a more subtle way from so-called punctual temporal speci cations, which are known to be capable of simulating the halting problem 5] .
In this work we introduce a real-time speci cation formalism based on linear logic 19, 20, 48, 49] . A clear advantage of our approach is that it provides a common user with a very easy and transparent way of writing high-level speci cations without having to be concerned with operational issues. Linear logic seems a natural choice for a logical speci cation formalism in this regard because of its intrinsic ability to re ect state transitions. Indeed, the most straightforward and naive way of writing very simple propositional logic formulas that correspond to the informal natural language descriptions of state transition systems is actually rigorous and correct in linear logic, while this way of writing speci cations is incorrect in classical logic. This is discussed in detail below and in the railroad-crossing example in Section 2.
INTRODUCTION 2
The best way to model, specify, and prove time-sensitive properties of real-time systems would be to use natural language. While this might be possible in the future, today it is customary to resort to various formal languages for this purpose. Among these, the formal language that has been most investigated and best understood is traditional predicate logic. In principle one could express various properties and requirements of real-time systems by means of formulas built up from certain basic, or atomic, predicates by traditional logical connectives and quanti ers. However, such a general approach in the framework of traditional predicate logic runs into di culties, for example, the undecidability of predicate logic with binary predicates.
For purely qualitative time properties of real-time systems such as sometimes, always, never, it su ces to consider \time-closed" formulas where all time variables are bound by quanti ers. Such qualitative time properties can be handled within the temporal logic framework where all time variables are encapsulated by means of temporal-modal operators on the propositional level. There are a number of successful investigations in this line of research, for instance 46, 51] . However, one runs into di culties with this approach in handling quantitative time properties such as \within B time units afterwards", \never for more than B time units", that refer to explicit time delays. In the case of such quantitative time constraints, in order to represent current states of a given real-time system temporal logic is to be equipped with rst-order means so that time parameters cannot be handled but explicitly, beyond the propositional logical framework. There are other solutions, such as the temporal logic of actions TLA 33, 1] , where real time is handled explicitly by introducing a variable to represent time. However, it is not easy to describe a decidable fragment of TLA suited for describing system requirements such as safety and liveness.
In this paper we introduce an approach that allows handling both qualitative and quantitative time aspects of real-time systems in purely logical terms, where the di culties of being over-sophisticated and over-complicated are obviated within the framework of monadic Horn fragment of linear logic in the sense of 28]. This simple fragment of linear logic can be communicated to the common users without requiring any sophistication in logic. Let us describe the main idea of our approach. For real-time systems with their peculiar time, one of the basic primitive relations one deals with is of the form P(e; t) \an event e happens in the system at moment t":
In order to circumvent the di culties caused by binary predicates (which, for example, usually lead to undecidability of the system), one may split P(e; t) into two unary predicates: a \timeless predicate" Q(e) that means \event e happens in the system" and the unique \time predicate" Time(t) that means \time is t (on the global clock)". That is, P(e; t) (Q(e) and Time(t)):
Suppose that a given action is performed in such a way that a certain event e 1 at moment t 1 is followed by another event e 2 at moment t 2 (as a delayed e ect). A naive way of formalizing this action is by a \Horn axiom" of the form P(e 1 ; t 1 ) implies P(e 2 ; t 2 ). Following our unarization procedure, this axiom is supposed to be encoded as:
(Q(e 1 ) and Time(t 1 )) implies (Q(e 2 ) and Time(t 2 )):
However, such a straightforward reduction to unary predicates requires certain precautions related to the exact meaning of the connectives and and implies. In particular, the traditional understanding of and and implies as boolean connectives^and ), respectively, yields unintended consequences such as (Q(e 1 )^Time(t 1 )) ) (Q(e 1 )^Q(e 2 )^Time(t 1 )^Time(t 2 )); 1 INTRODUCTION 3 that is, P(e 1 ; t 1 ) ) (P (e 1 ; t 1 )^P (e 2 ; t 2 )), and furthermore (Q(e 1 )^Time(t 1 )) ) (Q(e 1 )^Time(t 2 )); that is, P(e 1 ; t 1 ) ) P(e 1 ; t 2 ).
The main reason behind these problems is that our and is intended to represent only the \con-current coexistence", while the traditional conjunction^can behave in many di erent ways. This is one reason why as a possible logical setting we propose linear logic, a resource-sensitive re nement of classical logic 19, 20, 48, 49] , where the traditional conjunction^is split into two connectives:
(tensor) and & (with), and the traditional implication ) is re ned as linear implication ? . Revealing the \concurrent coexistence" nature of , we encode the basic binary relation P(e; t) by a linear logic formula of the form Q(e) Time(t). Accordingly, the action discussed above will be speci ed by a linear logic implication of the form Concrete examples of this phenomenon are discussed in the railroad-crossing example in Section 2. Important system properties such as safety are represented in our approach as certain pspace decision properties related to provability in linear logic. In terms of complexity, this indicates a good t with the automata-theoretic approach 3, 4] and its pspace-complete problem of emptiness of the language associated to an automaton, in contrast with the expspace-complete properties related to satis ability in metric interval temporal logic 5]. By way of comparison between our setting and the automata-theoretic approach, let us emphasize that one of the central concepts used in veri cation is reachability, in the sense that safety is seen as unreachability. Our approach provides a simple and direct correspondence between reachability and the traditional logical concept of provability. In contrast, the traditional concept emphasized in the automata-theoretic approach is the language emptiness problem, while reachability is treated there only as a derived, subsidiary notion. Moreover, the way reachability is derived from language emptiness in the automata-theoretic approach involves nontrivial technical operations such as language intersection and complementation. The exact nature of a relationship between our approach and the automata-theoretic approach remains to be determined.
Let us note that the method of proof of our main complexity result shows that, aside from complexity bounds, decision problems that involve temporal constraints may be dealt with by running a nite proof search, with some guidance, in the available concurrent logic programming environments based on linear logic 9, 10, 24, 25, 41, 30, 31, 32, 13] or in the environments supporting multiset rewriting 17, 22] or concurrent rewriting 40, 44] , either of which would in this case act as sort of model-checkers. Indeed, our current work may be seen as a rst step toward a larger issue of proof-based state exploration in contrast to model-checking, which is model-based. One advantage of our approach is that it incorporates a decision procedure, so that either it provides unsafe runs or it actually establishes safety.
Technically, our framework may be seen as a combination of local transitions and global, quantitative time correlations. In our framework transitions are instantaneous but events may have duration.
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Regarding the transitions, our framework is a re nement of the work in 11, 21, 18, 39, 15] , which established a direct relationship between Petri nets and linear logic axiomatizations using conjunctive formulas. Here we consider only conjunctions of xed nite length. In linear logic this restriction su ces for a faithful simulation of nite state transitions.
We extend this underlying framework to real-time systems by using global constraints formulated by means of alarms (timers, time guards.) Our use of these devices is generally motivated by \an old-fashioned approach" in 1], although our actual technical treatment of the timers is somewhat di erent. Let us illustrate our combination of local transitions and global time constraints in more detail on the standard railroad-crossing example.
Example: Railroad-Crossing Controller
The railroad-crossing system we consider consists of a train, a signal, and a gate. The train goes from being safe to approaching, then to crossing, and then back to being safe. The signal may be set to either raise or lower. The gate has four options: up, down, moving up, or moving down.
The controller senses when the train starts approaching and sets the signal to lower within D time units. When the signal is set to lower, then the gate starts moving down within G time units. Once the gate starts moving down, it is down within L time units. When the train is safe, the signal is set to raise, and in turn, the gate starts moving up, and is then up. For the purposes of this simple example, no time bounds are placed on this suite. In addition to that, the train is supposed to spend at least B time units going from safe to crossing.
The main safety property of the system is that when the train is crossing, then the gate is down.
A common assumption is that B > D + G + L.
Specifying Timeless Transitions
In order to let the reader develop some feel for the way linear logic operates, let us rst discuss in detail linear logic speci cations of timeless transitions. Because of the resource-sensitive nature of linear logic, the most naive way of writing logical formulas corresponding to the informal English description above is actually rigorous and correct. For instance, changing the signal from lower to raise when the train is safe is speci ed by the formula:
(Tr(safe) Sig(low)) ? (Tr(safe) Sig(raise)); (1) where (tensor) is a linear logic version of conjunction and ? is linear implication. The meaning of a linear implication A ? B is not simply that A implies B but that A is consumed or spent and that B is produced. This is re ected in the linear logic rules of inference. For instance, a linear logic counterpart A ? (A A) of the traditional propositional tautology A ) (A^A) is not provable in linear logic. This expressive ability of linear logic to distinguish between one and two occurrences of a formula re ects the common sense that $1 cannot be spent to produce a $1 and another $1. In our situation this expressive ability makes it possible for the linear logic speci cation (1) to stipulate that the signal changes from lower to raise. A similar formula in classical or in intuitionistic logic (Tr(safe)^Sig(low)) ) (Tr(safe)^Sig(raise)) is incorrect in this regard, because the tautology A ) (A^A) allows us to infer (Tr(safe)^Sig(low)) ) (Tr(safe)^Sig(low)^Sig(raise)); which does not correspond to reality, because the signal cannot be both lower and raise at once. It is for this reason that we choose linear logic. This logic allows us to represent con gurations of a nite-state system in a simple-minded way as conjunctions of xed nite length.
Let us also mention that simply writing Sig(low) ? Sig(raise) is incorrect in linear logic for the same reason that Sig(low) ) Sig(raise) is incorrect in classical or in intuitionistic logic, namely the signal is supposed to be changed when the train is safe, not unconditionally. Furthermore, writing (Tr(safe) Sig(low)) ? Sig(raise) is also incorrect because it stipulates that the train somehow ceases being safe as the signal is changed. In linear logic this formula is not equivalent to the correct speci cation mentioned above. Note that in classical or in intuitionistic logic, the analog (Tr(safe)^Sig(low)) ) Sig(raise) is equivalent to the formula (Tr(safe)^Sig(low)) ) (Tr(safe)^Sig(raise)) discussed above.
Raising the gate is speci ed in a similar way by the following three formulas:
(Sig(raise) Gate(moving down)) ? (Sig(raise) Gate(moving up));
(Sig(raise) Gate(down)) ? (Sig(raise) Gate(moving up));
Gate(moving up) ? Gate(up):
Let U be the set consisting of the formulas (1), (2), (3), and (4 Sig(low) Gate(down), the query on the goal Tr(safe) Sig(raise) Gate(up) will be answered positively, while the query on the goal Tr(safe) Sig(low) Gate(up) will be answered negatively.
Specifying Timed Transitions
We generally adopt \an old-fashioned recipe" from 1] but with some modi cations, which are discussed below. Time is represented globally as a variable ranging over a dense linear ordering R that includes the natural numbers, for instance the non-negative reals or the non-negative rationals. On the other hand, timing conditions are expressed by means of mutually independent alarms or alarms. Intuitively, perhaps these are best seen as analogous to the alarm mechanism in an alarm-clock, not to the clock itself. Our alarm may be either o or it may be set to some nite time value. Note that the value of a alarm may be a time value, which is necessarily nite, or the value o , which may be technically represented as +1. Each timing condition is expressed by its own alarm that is distinct from other alarms. Let us consider some aspects of the railroad-crossing example in order to see how alarms may be used. Initially, all alarms are o . We rst describe an upper-bound alarm. Recall that when the train starts approaching the signal is set to lower within D time units. Say the train starts approaching at time t 0 . The alarm Hi D is set to t 0 + D, in expectation of the signal to be lower in the future. The information that the alarm Hi D is on will be used as a precondition for setting the signal to lower.
When that transition is completed, then the alarm Hi D will be turned o (i.e., set to 1.) We also require that time t progresses below the value of Hi D . In this way, the signal must be set to lower within D time units.
Let us now consider a lower-bound alarm. The assumption that the train spends more than B time units going from safe to crossing may be described as follows. If the train starts approaching at time t 0 , set the alarm Lo B to t 0 + B. Then the condition that t t 0 + B is included into the preconditions for the train changing from approaching to crossing. The alarm Lo B is turned o when the train is crossing.
Given this behavior of the alarms, the timed transitions of the railroad-crossing controller may be speci ed in linear logic in the following way, where q 0 2 R, where the variables s and t range over R, the variables r; x; y, and z range over R 1 = R f+1g. Let 
The rst three linear implications represent the transitions of the train and the control of the associated alarms. The rst formula speci es the train transition from safe to approaching. Note that this is the only way to turn on the alarms Hi D and Lo B . The second formula describes the train transition from approaching to crossing, and it involves the condition associated with the lower-bound train alarm. The binary predicate \ " represents the usual weak ordering on the reals extended with +1, and is treated here as in classical logic (see Section 3.) The fourth formula governs the setting of the signal to lower. Note that we include a precondition for this transition that the associated upperbound alarm Hi D is on, and in this way we depart from the way upper-bound alarms are used in 1].
When this transition is completed, this alarm is turned o . The fth and sixth formulas similarly specify the behavior of the gate. As in 1], we also specify the progress of time:
: This is the most complicated kind of speci cation in our approach. It expresses the requirement that as time progresses, the current time never exceeds the value of any upper-bound alarm that is turned on. No such condition is necessary for lower-bound alarms. Note that the global nature of time is expressed by a single formula that indicates the relationship of time to all upper-bound alarms at once, instead of having several formulas, each indicating a relationship of time to each upper-bound alarm, one by one. The latter would be incorrect because some alarms might get turned o by actions involving other alarms. Let us also note that in our particular example we chose to interpret all upper-bound alarms as weak upper bounds. If, for instance, the alarm Hi D is to be understood as imposing a strict upper bound, then in the formula just above we would write t < x instead of t x, and similarly for other upper-bound alarms.
Let V be the set consisting of the untimed axioms in U together with all the linear implications just listed. Let Init be the formula describing the initial condition where the train is safe and all alarms are o .
The main safety property may be expressed in our setting as follows:
In formulas of the form P(a) ? P(b), where P(a) is any chosen formula of the form P i1 (a i1 ) : : : P in (a in ), 1 n N, the indices are mutually distinct and they indicate some numbers between 1 and N. Each a i j is a constant indicating an element of E i j , and P(b) is the same formula with b i j instead of a i j . We also allow more compact expressions in which some constants a i j are replaced by variables u i j ranging over E i j . Speci cations may also include nitely many timed changes i.e., formulas of the form (P(a) Time(t) SHi(x) SLo(z) RHi(y) Less(y; 1) RLo(r) Lbound(r; t)) ?
(P(b) Time(t) SHi(xj(t + hi)) SLo(t + lo) RHi(1) RLo(1)); that indicates state changes, upper-bound alarms to be set, lower-bound alarms to be set, other upperbound alarms to be released, i.e., turned o , as well as other lower-bound alarms to be conditionally released, together with the corresponding conditions. SLo(z) indicates the lower-bound alarms to be set. More precisely, SLo(z) is any chosen formula of the form 1 or Lo j1 (z j1 ) : : : Lo jm (z jm ), where 1 m M, the indices are mutually distinct and they indicate some numbers between 1 and M.
RLo(r) indicates the lower-bound alarms to be conditionally turned o . More precisely, RLo(r) is any chosen formula of the form 1 or Lo`1 (r`1) : : : Lo`k(r`k ), where 1 k M, the indices are mutually distinct and they indicate some numbers between 1 and M distinct from j 1 ; : : : ; j m . Lbound(r; t) is a tensor product of formulas of the form 1 or (r`j < t), or (r`j t), or r`j < 1. SHi(x) and RHi(y) are de ned similarly. They represent upper-bound alarms to be set and other upper-bound alarms to be released, respectively. We should also observe that Less(y; 1) denotes a tensor product of formulas of the form 1 or (y`j < 1) and that t, the x's, the z's, the y's, and the r's are all syntactically distinct individual variables. xj(t + hi) is the expression such that for each q 2 R and p 2 R 1 , pj(q + hi) = q + hi if p = 1 else p, where hi is the corresponding bound. (Another, equivalent way of formulating the speci cations is stated in the Appendix.) Within our framework, we express the safety property in the following way. is not derivable from a set of axioms S, specifying our system, and a certain formula Init describing initial conditions. In the next section we will show that such safety problems are decidable, and, moreover, these problems can be resolved in polynomial space. 4 Decidability in PSPACE Let S be a nite set of speci cations. We consider the following parameterized provability problem.
Given any initial con guration described by the formula It should be pointed out that given an initial con guration, the positive answer means that our system is unsafe with respect to b 1 , . . . , b N . At the same time, this problem may be viewed as a kind of satis ability problem, where q, the p i 's, and choices of rules of inference in a proof search constitute a kind of assignment or model. Theorem 4.1 The parametric provability problem is decidable in polynomial space in the total size of the input that consists only of S and the bounds hi i and lo j .
We may assume without loss of generality that the bounds hi i , lo j are natural numbers: the rational case easily follows by multiplication by the least common multiple of all denominators.
The reduced problem is again a parametric provability problem, but the existential problem in- . This problem does not involve the reals or the inequalities. This new problem may be solved on-line, with some guidance, in the available automated environments based on linear logic 9, 10, 24, 25, 41, 30, 31, 32, 13] , or in environments supporting multiset rewriting 17, 22] . In addition, note that the new decision problem is related to the standard reachability problem in a nite directed graph. and where v represents a complete list of answers to the questions indicated in conditions (2) ? (4) in the de nition of equivalence. Note that in regard to each of the two lists of questions in (2) and likewise in (3) it su ces to specify the least m for which the answer is \yes", if any. Let Q be a formal unary predicate on D. Regarding the polynomial space bound, indeed, we will take advantage of the fact that each of the names (a; v) and, hence, each of the new timeless transitions can be encoded in polynomial space. Furthermore, although there are in general exponentially many new transitions, we can manage our exptime decision procedure so that those transitions do not have to be written down all at once (which requires exponential space). We will generate the new transitions as needed in our decision procedure.
Conclusions and Future Work
We have investigated linear logic speci cations of real-time, nite-state systems. A clear advantage of our approach is that it provides a common user with a very easy and transparent way of writing high-level speci cations without having to be concerned with operational issues. In our approach, the runs of the system that satis es the given speci cations are exactly the linear logic proofs from the axioms given by the speci cations, where proofs are presented in a certain normal form. In this way, an important system safety property, which means that certain system con gurations are unreachable, is directly related to the logical notion of provability, in the sense that the formulas representing certain system con gurations are unprovable from the speci cation axioms, and vice versa.
We show that provability is in pspace relative to the size of the speci cation axioms. (pspacehardness is likely, because we may use punctual time speci cations to simulate linear-bounded ma-chines.) Our method of proof actually shows that syntactic properties involving temporal constraints may be decided, with some guidance, by nite proof search in the available logic programming environments based on linear logic 9, 10, 24, 25, 41, 30, 31, 32, 13] or in environments supporting multiset rewriting 17, 22] or concurrent rewriting 40, 44] , either of which would in this case act as sort of model-checkers. In this sense, our work is a rst step toward the study of proof-based state exploration. One advantage of our approach over model-based state exploration such as model-checking, is that our approach incorporates a decision procedure, so that either it provides unsafe runs or it actually establishes safety.
Our approach based on proof search represents concurrency by interleaving of proof rules, which take turns in being applied as atomic transitions. As with other interleaving models of concurrency such as 38], it is important to reconcile the formal approach by means of interleaved applications of proof rules with the notion of overlapped or even simultaneous executions of independent processors in actual concurrent systems. We are currently investigating several techniques of achieving this reconciliation, including the modelling within our approach of standard techniques from 38] such as introduction of additional states and events. However, our linear logic approach may provide other possible solutions as well, perhaps by means of so-called additive connectives.
The distinctions between multiplicative and additive connectives in linear logic might also be involved in expressing system properties such as fairness and liveness. This might also involve nontrivial combinations of rst-order quanti ers. We plan to investigate this in the future, aided by the known exptime decidability of the pure rst-order multiplicative-additive linear logic 36, 35] . Because our complexity bound argument involves a further exponential reduction of timed transitions to a timeless setting, it would be at this level that one might expect the linear logic provability analogue of the known expspace-complete satis ability in metric interval temporal logic 5]. Beyond the real-time systems, it would be quite interesting to see how the more general hybrid systems 2, 8] t into our framework.
After the completion of this work, we became aware of the work of Fages et al. 16 ] on using phase models of linear logic for the veri cation of concurrent constraint programs. While their approach is model-based, it would be interesting to understand common points of their approach and ours and to investigate possible gains of combining them.
